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The Costs of Abusing Probationary 
Sentences 
OVERINCARCERATION AND THE EROSION OF DUE 
PROCESS 
Andrew Horwitz† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The American criminal justice system has an apparent 
addiction to the use of probation as a means for adjudicating 
vast numbers of cases, particularly misdemeanors. With little 
discussion of or agreement about the appropriateness or 
efficacy of this sentencing practice, probation has become by far 
the most common form of criminal sentencing. While the 
primary justification given for such heavy reliance on probation 
is that we simply do not have the resources to incarcerate these 
offenders, that justification cannot survive serious scrutiny. In 
the first instance, it relies on the premise that we would, if we 
could, incarcerate huge numbers of low-level offenders, a 
proposition that is highly unrealistic. Additionally, however, 
because probation violators constitute the fastest growing 
component of an exploding prison population, it may well be 
that our reliance on probation as a default sentence is not 
really reducing our incarceration ranks, but simply 
reorganizing them to incarcerate different offenders.1 So if the 
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thank Wendy Andrade, Emily Drosback and Lynn Laweryson for their able research 
assistance and my wife and children for their love and support. 
 1 There are tremendous but largely unexplored public policy ramifications 
when decisions about whom to incarcerate are made in such a backward and 
unintentional fashion. For instance, if any interaction with the criminal justice system 
can easily escalate to incarceration, the system will disproportionately incarcerate 
those who are most likely to have that interaction, most notably the urban poor and 
people of color. See, e.g., Jerome Miller, Do We Really Need More Prisons?, N.J. 
RECORD, May 14, 1989, at O1 (noting that in certain parts of the country, seven out of 
ten young black men can expect to be arrested at least once). 
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use of probation as a default sentence for those we do not 
incarcerate cannot be justified on those grounds, why have we 
continued down this path? And at what cost? 
There are two clear and direct consequences of the 
overuse and abuse of probation as a criminal disposition. The 
first is that we are losing a tremendous opportunity to use 
probation for its historically intended purpose: rehabilitation. 
When the numbers of probationers becomes so large that 
supervision and the provision of services and support becomes 
impossible, the reformative potential of probation is completely 
lost. The second and more disturbing consequence is the 
creation of a shadow criminal justice system in which an 
extraordinary percentage of criminal charges is resolved not 
through our normal adjudicative process, but rather through a 
probation violation process that runs roughshod over the 
constitutional rights of the accused. When a probationer is 
charged with a new criminal offense, that new offense typically 
generates a corresponding allegation that the probationer 
violated the terms of his or her probation. When the new 
charge is processed as an alleged probation violation, the 
probationer is entitled only to a limited hearing at which the 
rules of evidence are relaxed, the right to confrontation is 
limited, the burden of proof is far lower than the usual beyond 
a reasonable doubt standard, and the right to a trial by jury is 
non-existent. The outcome of this violation hearing will often 
obviate the relevance of any trial on the new charge. A 
probationer facing such a violation hearing, with its quite 
limited prospect for a successful outcome, will most often 
simply admit to the new charge, whether innocent or not. 
This Article will explore each of these consequences in 
depth and provide some ideas for constructive ways to avoid 
them. In Part II, the Article will describe the evolution of 
probation from its roots as a condition imposed upon a select 
population of criminal defendants who seemed likely to benefit 
from assistance, support, and supervision, to the default 
sentence imposed upon a majority of defendants with little to 
no regard for whether probation makes sense for that 
defendant. As our prison population grows larger and larger, a 
relatively small amount of our corrections budget is designated 
for probation departments, resulting in minimal or, in many 
cases, no supervision or provision of services to an exploding 
probation population. We have overwhelmed probation 
departments so that they cannot possibly perform the function 
that we hope they might. Recognizing this, we have abandoned 
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any prospect that probation might assist a defendant’s 
rehabilitation and now use it simply as a noose around an 
offender’s neck, waiting for the inevitable violation. Not 
surprisingly, recidivism and failure to adhere to the technical 
requirements of probation have created a burgeoning prison 
population. Having placed an offender on probation, a court 
often feels compelled to respond to a violation with 
incarceration in order to maintain credibility. And, in that 
fashion, probation imposed upon a defendant who never needed 
programmatic support and supervision, or who needed it but 
never got it, turns a case that never merited incarceration into 
an incarceration case. In the process, we have created a cycle 
out of which many defendants never emerge, preventing them 
from obtaining jobs and decent housing. 
Part III of this Article will detail the probation violation 
process, explaining how the process has largely taken over the 
criminal justice system, eradicating some of the constitutional 
rights and protections that we hold most dear. We have created 
a second class of citizens—those on probation—for whom the 
Constitution no longer applies in any meaningful way. The 
rights and protections inherent in our legal system, developed 
and refined over the past two centuries, are relegated to the 
caboose of a train driven by the probation violation process. 
The end result is often that any interaction whatsoever with 
the criminal justice system can escalate into incarceration, 
which means that those most likely to have low-level 
interactions with the criminal justice system—the urban poor 
and people of color—will suffer disproportionately.  
Part IV will suggest a return to an earlier time when 
probation was used with a specific purpose in mind, reserved 
for those defendants who can truly benefit from support and 
supervision. In order to allow probation to engage in 
meaningful support and supervision, the number of 
probationers each probation officer is expected to supervise 
must be drastically reduced. One means of accomplishing this, 
of course, would be a significant expansion in funding allowing 
for the hiring of many more probation officers. In today’s 
economic and political climate, however, the likelihood of 
greater funding for probation on the scale that would be 
required is simply unrealistic. Although these concepts are not 
mutually exclusive, a more feasible and realistic approach 
would entail a significant reduction in the number of 
probationers. This reduction can be accomplished by ending the 
concept of unsupervised probation and by significantly 
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expanding the use of other alternative sentencing options. If we 
move beyond the “probation-as-default” approach of the last 
few decades and return to using probation only when actual 
support and supervision are merited, we can accomplish 
several crime control objectives and avoid unnecessary fiscal 
and human costs. 
Finally, Part V of this Article will propose changes to 
the probation violation process to enhance the fairness and 
reliability of the criminal justice system. To maintain the 
integrity of the criminal justice system, we must stop using 
probation as a means of engaging in an end-run around the 
system’s mechanisms for protecting the rights of defendants. 
Except under extraordinary circumstances, the hearing 
concerning an alleged probation violation predicated on a new 
criminal charge should not be held before the resolution of the 
new charge. If the probationer is acquitted of the new charge or 
the new charge is dismissed, the violation allegation should 
likewise be dismissed. If the probationer is convicted of or 
admits to a new charge, he or she can be sentenced on the 
probation violation accordingly. By sequencing the events in 
this fashion, we can avoid the use of the probation violation 
hearing as a substitute for a trial. In so doing, we can restore 
some of the public’s eroded faith in the fairness and integrity of 
the system. 
II. FROM POSITIVE REHABILITATIVE TOOL TO LOST 
OPPORTUNITY 
A. The Origins of Probation 
The origins of probation in the United States can be 
traced to a Boston cobbler named John Augustus, referred to as 
the “father of probation.” In the 1840s, Augustus intervened in 
the Massachusetts court system on behalf of thousands of 
“common drunkards” and “petty criminals.”2 The prevailing 
penal philosophy of the eighteenth century was quite severe, 
suggesting that the only response to criminal behavior was 
harsh corporal punishment.3 Reforms during the early 
  
 2 See 1 NEIL P. COHEN, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE § 1:3 (2d ed. 
1999); PAUL F. CROMWELL, JR. ET AL., PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 10 (2d ed. 1985); Wayne A. Logan, The Importance of Purpose in 
Probation Decision Making, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 171, 174-75 (2003). 
 3 COHEN, supra note 2, § 1:2; CROMWELL, supra note 2, at 5. 
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nineteenth century focused on the replacement of corporal 
punishment with incarceration.4 Augustus’s intervention was 
part of a larger reform movement that questioned the 
retributive orientation of the criminal justice system and 
sought a greater focus on the rehabilitation of the offender. 
Augustus’s view was that the purpose of the criminal law 
should be “to reform criminals and to prevent crime, and not to 
punish maliciously or from a spirit of revenge.”5 
Early on, Augustus’s efforts were roundly criticized as 
being soft on crime and encouraging criminal behavior.6 But 
due in part to the widespread recognition that prisons were not 
serving any rehabilitative purpose and in part to Augustus’s 
early successes, the concept of probation became more popular 
and more widely accepted. In 1878, Massachusetts passed the 
first probation statute, followed quickly by a number of other 
states.7 By 1925, all forty-eight states and the federal 
government formally adopted probation by statute.8 
Although Augustus supervised over two thousand 
probationers in his eighteen years in the field,9 he chose them 
carefully, recognizing that probation would not be an 
appropriate disposition for every offender. As he described the 
process, “Great care was observed, of course, to ascertain 
whether the prisoners were promising subjects for probation, 
and to this end it was necessary to take into consideration the 
previous character of the person, his age, and the influences by 
which he would in future be likely to be surrounded.”10 In the 
early part of the twentieth century, the prevailing notions of 
probation incorporated this selective ideal. A summary of the 
professional literature in 1960 described probation as “the 
application of modern, scientific case work to specially selected 
offenders who are placed by the court under the personal 
supervision of a probation officer . . . and given treatment 
  
 4 COHEN, supra note 2, § 1:2; CROMWELL, supra note 2, at 5. 
 5 CROMWELL, supra note 2, at 11 (quoting JOHN AUGUSTUS, A REPORT OF 
THE LABORS OF JOHN AUGUSTUS 23 (1852)). 
 6 Id.; Logan, supra note 2, at 176; Joan Petersilia, Probation in the United 
States, 22 CRIME & JUST. 149, 155-56 (1997) [hereinafter Petersilia, Probation]. 
 7 Logan, supra note 2, at 175. 
 8 CROMWELL, supra note 2, at 12. 
 9 Logan, supra note 2, at 175. 
 10 CROMWELL, supra note 2, at 10 (quoting JOHN AUGUSTUS, A REPORT OF 
THE LABORS OF JOHN AUGUSTUS 34 (1852)). 
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aimed at their complete and permanent social rehabilitation.”11 
The expansion of probation coincided with a significant shift in 
the prevailing philosophy of the criminal justice system away 
from retribution and in the direction of reform and 
rehabilitation. In 1949, the United States Supreme Court 
recognized the magnitude of the attitudinal shift: “Retribution 
is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. 
Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become 
important goals of criminal jurisprudence.”12 
The second half of the twentieth century brought with it 
a number of developments. Perhaps the most notable was the 
abandonment of the notion that probation was a disposition 
that should be reserved for specially selected offenders. The 
newly minted Model Penal Code suggested a “probation-as-
default” approach to criminal sentencing, suggesting that all 
cases should be resolved with probation unless incarceration 
was absolutely necessary for public protection.13 Similarly, the 
American Bar Association’s Standards for Criminal Justice 
suggested that “the automatic response in a sentencing 
situation ought to be probation, unless particular aggravating 
factors emerge in the case at hand.”14 What followed was a 
substantial expansion of the probation population15 as 
probation quickly became “the most common form of criminal 
sentencing in the United States.”16 Between the 1950s and the 
1970s, probation “evolved in relative obscurity” until published 
reports in the 1970s exposed the massive underfunding of 
probation departments and criticized the utility of probation as 
a criminal disposition.17 
B. Probation in the Modern Era 
In what many view as a watershed event, sociologist 
Robert Martinson in 1974 published a meta-analysis of over 
two hundred evaluations of rehabilitative programs, famously 
  
 11 Logan, supra note 2, at 180 n.42 (alteration in original) (quoting Lewis 
Diana, What is Probation?, 51 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POL. SCI. 189, 197 (1960)). 
 12 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949). 
 13 See Logan, supra note 2, at 181-87 (detailing the creation of the Model 
Penal Code provisions relating to probation). 
 14 AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 
STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION, Introduction (1970). 
 15 Logan, supra note 2, at 187. 
 16 Petersilia, Probation, supra note 6, at 149. 
 17 Id. at 157. 
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concluding that “nothing works.”18 While the scholarly 
community expressed serious concerns about the methodology 
employed19 and even Martinson himself tried later to qualify his 
conclusions,20 Martinson’s “nothing works” conclusion “quickly 
caught on with the public and politicians”21 and became “the 
rallying cry of a new generation of criminologists.”22 By the end 
of the 1980s, the abandonment of the rehabilitative ideal in 
favor of a retributive model of criminal justice was all but 
complete.23 
With the end of the rehabilitative ideal came an 
extraordinary and unprecedented movement toward 
incarceration. Criminologist Michael Tonry describes in stark 
terms “the modern American preoccupation with absolute 
severity of punishment and the related widespread view that 
only imprisonment counts.”24 As a consequence, the United 
States incarcerates a higher percentage of its citizens for a 
greater average duration than any other western nation.25 The 
prison and jail population in the United States increased 
nearly seven-fold from 1970 to the early twenty-first century,26 
with much of that growth coming in the 1990s and beyond. As 
of 2008, over 2.2 million Americans, one in every 131 people, 
were incarcerated.27 More than one in ten black males aged 25-
29 was in prison or jail.28 
One might think that the abandonment of the 
rehabilitative ideal and the increased reliance on incarceration 
would have foreshadowed the end of probation as a primary 
sentencing mode, but such was not to be the case. As the 
incarceration rates have grown, so too have the rates of 
defendants being placed on probation. The probation 
  
 18 Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers about Prison 
Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22, 48-49 (1974). 
 19 See Robert A. Shearer & Patricia Ann King, Multicultural Competencies in 
Probation—Issues and Challenges, FED. PROBATION, June 2004, at 3. 
 20 See Robert Martinson, New Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution 
Regarding Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 243, 244 (1979). 
 21 Logan, supra note 2, at 190. 
 22 Shearer & King, supra note 19, at 3. 
 23 See William D. Burrell, Trends in Probation and Parole in the States, in 
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, BOOK OF THE STATES 2005 595, 597 (2005). 
 24 MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 128 (1996). 
 25 Id.; THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FACTS ABOUT PRISONS AND PRISONERS 
(2009), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/inc_ 
factsaboutprisons_Dec2009.pdf. 
 26 Logan, supra note 2, at 190; THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 25. 
 27 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 25. 
 28 Id. 
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population in the United States almost tripled between 1980 
and 1997, from just over one million to more than three 
million,29 and that growth has continued unabated. By 2002, 
the number had climbed to over four million, a 30% increase 
between 1995 and 2002, and has since continued upward, 
reaching nearly 4.3 million in 2007.30 Probation cases accounted 
for over half of the growth in the entire correctional population 
between 1995 and 2006,31 and made up three quarters of the 
growth in the number of offenders under community 
supervision in 2007.32 Projections predict continued growth.33 
Within the adult population in the United States, 1.78% are 
presently on probation.34 The massive expansion of probation 
appears to be explained in many jurisdictions largely by prison 
overcrowding and insufficient funds to support further 
incarceration.35  
This extraordinary expansion of the probation system 
has not been accompanied by any correlating expansion in 
funding. As the number of probationers continues to rise in 
staggering proportions, spending on probation has been 
“stagnant or decreasing.”36 From 1977 to 1990 the number of 
probationers essentially tripled in size but spending as a 
percentage of governmental budgets did not change.37 During 
the same period, spending for prisons and jails doubled.38 
“Despite the fact that they handle the vast majority of the 
offender population, probation and parole receive less than ten 
  
 29 COHEN, supra note 2, § 1:1 n.2. 
 30 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 228230, 
PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2008, at 1 (2009) [hereinafter ANNUAL 
PROBATION SURVEY, 2008], available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
ppus08.pdf. 
 31 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 220218, 
PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2006, at 1-2 (2007). 
 32 ANNUAL PROBATION SURVEY, 2008, supra note 30, at 3 tbl.1. 
 33 Burrell, supra note 23, at 595. 
 34 ANNUAL PROBATION SURVEY, 2008, supra note 30, at 1. It is interesting to 
note for sake of comparison that while 1.78% of the nation’s adult population is on 
probation today, in 1980 only 1.12% of that same population was under any 
correctional supervision, including jail, prison, probation and parole. Id. 
 35 See COHEN, supra note 2, § 1:25. 
 36 Joan Petersilia, A Crime Control Rationale for Reinvesting in Community 
Corrections, 75 PRISON J. 479, 484 (1995) [hereinafter Petersilia, Crime Control].  
 37 Id. at 483-84. 
 38 Id. at 483. 
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percent of the correctional funding from state and local 
governments.”39 
Not surprisingly, then, two things have happened over 
the past few decades: caseloads for probation officers have 
grown exponentially, and the level of actual support and 
supervision has declined nearly to the point of non-existence. 
In the era when probation was viewed as a legitimate 
rehabilitative enterprise, recommendations for probation 
officer adult caseloads ranged from the 1967 President’s Crime 
Commission recommendation of thirty probationers40 to what 
the American Bar Association in 1970 called the “widely 
recognized standard” of fifty probationers.41 More recent reports 
estimate national caseloads averaging as high as 250 
probationers per officer.42 In data published in 1999, Rhode 
Island had the highest reported average of any state in the 
country with an average of over 350 probationers per 
supervising probation officer.43 
As caseloads have skyrocketed, supervision has 
precipitously declined. For significant numbers of probationers, 
probation means complete freedom from supervision. On the 
national level, the percentage of probationers who are even 
required to report to a probation officer declined from 79% in 
1995 to 70% in 2005.44 Locally, things appear to be much worse 
in the urban areas where most offenders live. A 1995 study of 
the probation system in Los Angeles, reporting caseloads in the 
hundreds, concluded that at least 60% of all probationers 
received no services or supervision of any kind.45 A similar 
study in Texas revealed that 95% of the 400,000 adults on 
probation were required to report only once every three 
months.46 A probation officer testifying in California in 1993, 
acknowledging that more than half of the probationers on his 
  
 39 Burrell, supra note 23, at 596; see also Petersilia, Crime Control, supra 
note 36, at 484. 
 40 See Petersilia, Crime Control, supra note 36, at 484. 
 41 AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, supra note 14, at Standard 6.1 cmt. 
 42 Petersilia, Probation, supra note 6, at 167. 
 43 AM. PROB. & PAROLE ASS’N, app. 1 tbl.11 (on file with author) (citing C.G. 
CAMP & G.M. CAMP, THE CORRECTIONS YEARBOOK 1999: ADULT CORRECTIONS (1999)). 
 44 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 215091, 
PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2005, at 6 tbl.3 (2006) [hereinafter 
ANNUAL PROBATION SURVEY, 2005], available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/ 
pub/pdf/ppus05.pdf. 
 45 Petersilia, Crime Control, supra note 36, at 484; Petersilia, Probation, 
supra note 6, at 169. 
 46 Petersilia, Crime Control, supra note 36, at 484. 
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caseload were completely unsupervised, summarized the 
situation quite starkly: 
On each judicial day hundreds of California judges sentence 
thousands of offenders to probation, sternly enumerating the many 
conditions of probation that are enforced by the probation officer. 
Unfortunately, virtually all of these offenders will never see a 
probation officer and there will be absolutely no enforcement of the 
court ordered conditions. Equally unfortunate is that all of the 
players in this drama—especially the offender—understand that the 
offenders will go unsupervised.47 
As a consequence of underfunding and growing caseloads, 
“probation supervision in many large jurisdictions amounts to 
simply monitoring for rearrest.”48 
C. A Shift in the Underlying Philosophy of Probation 
These trends in probation—exploding caseloads, little to 
no supervision—have been accompanied by a corresponding 
change in the prevailing philosophy undergirding and 
governing probation supervision. Because the history of 
probation is firmly rooted in the rehabilitative ideal, 
abandoning that ideal while at the same time increasing 
reliance on the use of probation required an adjustment in 
thinking. A “Justice Model” of probation, in which the primary 
focus of probation is retribution, emerged in the 1980s and 
remains dominant to this day.49 The decision to place an 
offender on probation has become much more likely to be 
motivated by a desire to exact retribution for criminal conduct 
while, at the same time, avoiding the state expense of 
incarceration.50 With the widespread adoption of the “nothing 
works” mantra, there is no real expectation of rehabilitation. 
Probation has shifted from being viewed as an alternative to 
punishment, supplemented with services and support, to being 
considered a punishment in and of itself, supplemented with 
obligations and restrictions on freedom.51 Even the American 
  
 47 Id. at 486 (quoting testimony of Robert Kelgord before the Commission on 
the Future of the California Courts, 1993). 
 48 Id.; see also Robin Campbell & Robert V. Wolf, Problem-Solving Probation: 
An Overview of Four Community Based Experiments, TEX. J. CORRECTIONS, Aug. 2001, 
at 8, 9 (noting that “at best, a handful of probationers may get the necessary referrals 
and support to guide them on a path of reform while the vast majority live in the 
community with virtually no supervision”). 
 49 COHEN, supra note 2, § 1:5; CROMWELL, supra note 2, at 111. 
 50 COHEN, supra note 2, §§ 1:9, 1:25. 
 51 Id. at § 1:6; Logan, supra note 2, at 196. 
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Bar Association in its 1994 Standards for Criminal Justice 
abandoned the term “probation” in favor of the term 
“compliance programs.”52 The justice model “repudiates the 
notion that probation is a sanction designed to rehabilitate 
offenders in the community, and presents the concept that a 
sentence of probation represents a proportionate punishment 
lawfully administered for certain prescribed crimes.”53 Along 
those lines, the justice model “holds that current practices of 
counseling, surveillance, and reporting accomplish very little 
and have minimal impact on recidivism. On the other hand, 
probation that consists of monitoring court orders for victim 
restitution or community service and ensures that the imposed 
deprivation of liberty is carried out, represents a clear and 
achievable task.”54 
The adoption of the justice model brought with it a 
major change in both the staffing and the philosophy of 
probation departments. Traditionally, probation officers most 
commonly came from social work backgrounds.55 They often 
referred to themselves as “probation counselors” and to the 
probationers as “clients.” Under the justice model, the 
probation officer is much more likely to come from a law 
enforcement background, to call himself or herself a “probation 
officer,” and to refer to probationers as “offenders.”56 These 
changes in staffing and in language are reflective of the move 
away from the rehabilitative model and firmly in the direction 
of a retributive model. 
Viewing probation through a law enforcement 
perspective rather than a social work perspective has 
consequences, of course. If probation is about complying with 
conditions as a form of punishment, then noncompliance must 
be penalized if the system is to maintain any credibility.57 And 
that penalty is frequently incarceration.58 Two broad categories 
of offenders now flood the prison system: probationers who 
have failed to comply with some condition of probation—called 
“technical violators”—and probationers who have been 
  
 52 AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 
STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING § 18-3.13 cmt. (3d ed. 1994). 
 53 CROMWELL, supra note 2, at 111. 
 54 Id. at 111-12. 
 55 Id. at 105-07. 
 56 See id. at 105-12. 
 57 See TONRY, supra note 24, at 101-02. 
 58 See Petersilia, Probation, supra note 6, at 193. 
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rearrested on a new criminal allegation.59 With an almost 
complete absence of programmatic support or supervision, the 
fact that each of these categories is substantial ought not be 
terribly surprising. “Stated simply, offenders who fail while 
under community supervision constitute the fastest growing 
component of the prison and jail populations in this country.”60 
One study reports that probation violators represented 17% of 
prison admissions nationally in 1980 but by 1999 had doubled 
to 35%.61 Another study placed the figure at between 30% and 
50% of new admissions.62 Some state figures are substantially 
greater, reaching as high as 80% of new admissions.63 Because 
of the intractable nature of many of the causes of violations, 
“these revocation processes result in ‘churning,’ in which 
individuals repeatedly circulate in and out of custody . . . . It 
has become increasingly clear to correctional administrators 
and policymakers alike that this is a costly and 
counterproductive approach.”64 It has become equally clear that 
the “high failure rates of probationers and parolees . . . 
contribute significantly to prison crowding.”65 Something clearly 
must be done to reverse this path. 
III. THE PERVERSION OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 
A. The Probation Violation Cycle 
The fact that our prisons are being flooded with 
probation violators begs the question of how all of those 
probation violators were sentenced to jail time. The reality is 
that we have designed a shadow criminal justice system in 
which probationers can be sent to prison on little evidence and 
with little procedural protection. Record numbers of offenders 
are placed on probation each and every year, with probation 
  
 59 See id. at 166; Petersilia, Crime Control, supra note 36, at 488. 
 60 Faye S. Taxman & James M. Byrne, Locating Absconders: Results from a 
Randomized Field Experiment, FED. PROBATION, Mar. 1994, at 13, 13, see also 
Petersilia, Crime Control, supra note 36, at 488. 
 61 RYAN S. KING, CHANGING DIRECTION?: STATE SENTENCING REFORMS 2004-
2006, at 11 (The Sentencing Project 2007), available at http://www.sentencingproject. 
org/doc/publications/sentencingreformforweb.pdf. 
 62 Petersilia, Crime Control, supra note 36, at 488. 
 63 See Petersilia, Probation, supra note 6, at 166 (noting that Texas reported 
that 66% of all prison admissions in 1993 were probation or parole violators, while 
California reported a rate of over 60% and Oregon a rate of over 80%). 
 64 KING, supra note 61, at 11.  
 65 Petersilia, Crime Control, supra note 36, at 488. 
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serving as the default sentence for any offender who cannot or 
will not be incarcerated as an immediate consequence of the 
court’s adjudication of the case. In some jurisdictions, almost 
every misdemeanor is resolved by placing the offender on 
probation. If the offender sees a probation officer at all—and 
very many will not—the visit alone will be an end, not a means, 
of establishing compliance with the terms of probation. Failing 
to keep that appointment will result in the filing of a technical 
violation of probation. If there are special conditions attached 
to the term of probation, the offender will generally be expected 
to provide some evidence of compliance with those conditions. 
Because the probation officer has an unmanageable number of 
probationers to supervise, it is unlikely that any support 
services beyond referrals to underfunded or unavailable service 
providers will be offered or received. In the absence of available 
services, evidence of some effort to obtain services, even if 
wholly unsuccessful, will often be deemed as compliance. 
Absent an arrest on a new charge, the probationer will be 
deemed to have successfully completed the probationary term if 
he or she can comply with these minimal obligations. 
What of the probationer who cannot or does not comply 
with these obligations? The technical violator—the probationer 
who fails to appear for a scheduled appointment, fails a drug 
test, or fails to fulfill a special condition—will in all likelihood 
be brought before the sentencing court as a probation violator. 
Although the original criminal charge did not merit a jail 
sentence and the probationer has not been charged with 
engaging in new criminal activity, it is more likely than not 
that the probationer will now be incarcerated, at great expense 
to the government, and often for an extraordinarily long period 
of time.66 If the goal of the probationary sentence was to deter 
future criminal behavior, it is hard to justify incarceration in 
the absence of criminal behavior. The consequence of a 
probationer’s failure to meet what are often unrealistic 
expectations can frequently be a prison sentence far in excess 
of what anyone would ever have thought justified by the 
original criminal charge.67 In what might be viewed as a classic 
  
 66 See TONRY, supra note 24, at 105. 
 67 Criminologist Michael Tonry, in his book entitled Sentencing Matters, 
explores the argument that the high rates of technical violations of probation simply 
“expose the unreality and injustice of conditions—like prohibitions of drinking or 
expectations that offenders will conform to middle-class behavioral standards they 
have never observed before—that many offenders will foreseeably breach and that do 
not involve criminality. Many offenders have difficulty in achieving conventional, law-
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example of this scenario, a defendant in Arkansas who had 
been convicted of theft was eventually sentenced to five years 
in prison solely for failing to report to his probation officer as 
required.68 The defendant, who had been given permission to 
leave the state to look for work, explained that he had “moved a 
lot . . . looking for work, and that he could not always get the 
report, a stamp, and an envelope together.”69 The Court of 
Appeals of Arkansas upheld the five year sentence.70 In just this 
fashion, we often dedicate scarce prison resources to a failed 
probationer who committed a minor or non-violent crime rather 
than to an offender who committed a far more serious offense.  
But even more disturbing is the treatment of the 
probationer who is charged with a new crime. In many 
jurisdictions this probationer will be incarcerated as a matter 
of practice or as a matter of law while he or she awaits a 
probation violation hearing, whether or not the new charge 
merits incarceration.71 In all likelihood this probationer will end 
up incarcerated as a probation violator as a result of the new 
criminal allegation, and this remains the case even if the new 
charge is ultimately dismissed or, worse, even if he or she is 
ultimately acquitted on that charge after a trial.72 Most 
frequently the probation violation allegation will be used as a 
vehicle to force a resolution of the new criminal charge, leaving 
that charge completely untested by the normal adjudicative 
process. 
  
abiding patterns of living and many stumble along the way.” Id. He points out that a 
“traditional social work approach to community corrections would expect and accept 
the stumbles (so long as they do not involve significant new crimes) and hope that 
through them, with help, the offender will learn to be law-abiding.” Id. 
 68 Luyet v. State, CA CR 81-69, 1981 WL 930, at *1 (Ark. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 
1981). 
 69 Id. at *1. 
 70 Id. at *2. Similarly, in Morgan v. State, 588 S.W.2d 431 (Ark. 1979), the 
court upheld a three year prison sentence for a defendant who had pled guilty to 
forgery and who, while on probation, moved out of state without permission to obtain 
employment. 
 71 Most efforts by probationers to be released while they await a hearing are 
unsuccessful. Because there is no constitutional presumption of innocence at a 
probation revocation proceeding, absent a statute allowing judges the discretion to 
grant bail, probationers will generally be held until their revocation hearing. COHEN, 
supra note 2, §§ 18:5-18:7. 
 72 Most jurisdictions justify this outcome by noting that the standard of proof 
during a probation violation is by a preponderance of the evidence, whereas during a 
criminal trial, the standard is beyond a reasonable doubt. The significant gap between 
these two standards of proof creates a very high likelihood that a probationer will be 
found guilty during a violation hearing even if they are acquitted during criminal 
proceedings. Id. § 22:15. 
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B. An End-Run Around the Constitution 
The honest truth is that the probation violation 
mechanism has in many cases completely taken over the 
mechanical functioning of criminal justice system. With 
unprecedented numbers of offenders on probation at any time, 
the likelihood that a defendant charged with a crime is 
presently on probation is high.73 In that scenario, the system 
lends itself to an end-run around all of the procedural 
protections in place to protect the innocent, and the simple 
exercise of constitutional rights is punished. The primary 
impact of probation on the criminal justice system is the 
generation of a shadow criminal justice system in which 
procedural protections such as the presumption of innocence 
and the right to a jury trial are disregarded and decisions 
about incarceration are made essentially by default. 
When a probationer is arrested on a new criminal 
charge, that person is brought before the court to be arraigned 
on the new charge. It is generally at that very same 
arraignment that the probationer is generally presented with 
the allegation that he or she, by committing the new crime, has 
violated his or her probationary terms. Often, there is a heavy 
presumption or even a requirement that the probationer will be 
incarcerated until the probation violation allegation is 
adjudicated.74 In the misdemeanor context, this presumption 
can frequently have the effect of coercing an immediate 
resolution of both the alleged probation violation and the new 
criminal charge.75 If a defendant can avoid further detention 
and obtain release from custody only by admitting a violation 
and pleading guilty to a new criminal charge, he or she will 
almost invariably exercise that option regardless of guilt or 
innocence.76 
A recent story in the Providence Journal chronicled the 
ugly path that the system can follow when a defendant is 
placed on probation. A woman engaged in a bitter divorce was 
repeatedly arrested and charged with misdemeanor offenses 
  
 73 In 2007, one in every forty-five adults in the United States was supervised 
in the community and over 80% of those being supervised were on probation. ANNUAL 
PROBATION SURVEY, 2008, supra note 30, at 1. 
 74 See COHEN, supra note 2, §§ 18:5-18:7; ANDREW R. KLEIN, ALTERNATIVE 
SENTENCING, INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS AND PROBATION 319 (2d ed. 1997). 
 75 See KLEIN, supra note 74, at 329. 
 76 See id. 
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based on allegations made by family members.77 On nine 
separate occasions she was held without bail as an alleged 
probation violator based on those allegations alone, sometimes 
for more than a month, until she was ultimately acquitted or 
the charge was dismissed.78 It is unclear whether she was ever 
offered the opportunity to enter an admission to any of those 
charges in order to avoid incarceration; if she had been offered 
that chance, she almost certainly would have taken it. It is the 
rare defendant indeed who will stay in custody in order to 
contest a charge when he or she can be released upon an 
admission of guilt.79 
With the looming threat of incarceration, the 
defendant’s status as a probationer acts as an almost complete 
barrier to challenging the veracity of the new criminal 
allegation or exercising any of the connected constitutional 
rights because the cost of doing so is more than most 
defendants can or will bear. While expedient, this process 
actually serves no constituency very well. Because the veracity 
and accuracy of the charges is unsubstantiated, the innocent 
can and do get swept up with the guilty. Because the validity of 
arrests and charges goes untested, sloppy or unlawful police 
and prosecutorial work gets rewarded. The defendant, unable 
to challenge even unjust or untrue charges, accumulates a 
criminal history from which he or she is unlikely to recover. 
And because what follows from the new charge is almost 
invariably yet another term of probation, the defendant walks 
closer and closer to that line of incarceration. Eventually, and 
often sooner rather than later, a defendant who has never 
received any support or social services and whose problems 
remain untreated winds up incarcerated on charges that 
nobody truly believes merit incarceration. And the injustice of 
  
 77 John Hill, Override Urged in Probation-Violation Veto, PROVIDENCE J., 
Dec. 17, 2009, at A13. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Another Rhode Island story makes this point in a rather stark fashion, 
albeit in the context of an alleged bail violation. Accused by an ex-boyfriend of violating 
a restraining order, a special needs teacher in her fifties was released on bail. Bob 
Kerr, She Paid When the Law Came Apart, PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 12, 2008, at B1. When 
the ex-boyfriend made another unsupported allegation, she faced the choice of 
admitting guilt to obtain her release or asserting her innocence enduring two weeks of 
incarceration to contest the charge. Id. On the day of her arraignment she initially 
asserted her innocence, but then changed her plea to avoid incarceration. Id. Unable to 
live with her false admission, she moved to vacate her plea and, when that motion was 
granted, she was jailed for two weeks. Id. Ultimately, all of the charges against her 
were dismissed. Id. 
2010] THE COSTS OF ABUSING PROBATIONARY SENTENCES 769 
this system falls disproportionately upon those for whom 
contact with the criminal justice system is most likely as a 
matter of sheer probability: the urban poor and people of color.80 
Contrast that same scenario with a defendant arrested 
on a new misdemeanor charge committed one day after his or 
her probation has expired. Because the probationary period has 
expired, he or she cannot be presented to the court as a 
probation violator and the defendant is likely to be free to 
exercise the rights related to challenging the charge without 
threat of immediate incarceration. And this is most often true 
even if the alleged crime took place while the person was still 
on probation.81 So a defendant arrested and brought to court on 
a new misdemeanor charge on the last day of his probation can 
and most often will be incarcerated without bail unless he 
admits to the new criminal charge, while that same defendant 
arrested on the same offense but two days later maintains all 
  
 80 It is a well documented reality that people of color are more likely to be 
stopped by the police and that their encounters with the police are more likely to result 
in arrests. Examples abound. The New York City Police Department reported stopping 
and searching over 500,000 people in 2007; 86% of those stopped and searched were 
black or Latino. Steven Zeidman, Time to End Violation Pleas, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 1, 2008, 
at 2. In that same year, the Los Angeles Police Department reported that 34.4% of the 
motor vehicle drivers that it stopped were white, while 18.7% were black, and 37.4% 
were Hispanic. See Noah Kupferberg, Transparency: A New Role for Police Consent 
Decrees, 42 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 129, 164 app. A (2008). While the numbers of 
people pulled over appear to have been roughly in proportion to the percentages of each 
race stopped, a marked difference existed in the number of motorists asked to exit their 
vehicles and subjected to a search. While just 17.0% of the motorists asked to exit were 
white, 25.0% were black and 53.2% were Hispanic. Id. at 165 app. A. Similarly, of the 
motorists who were searched once outside of their vehicles, only 11.6% were white, 
while 31.0% were black and 54.6% were Hispanic. Id. Obviously, more stops and more 
searches will result in more arrests. While any encounter between a police officer and a 
citizen can escalate into an arrest, people of color are statistically much more likely to 
be arrested in that kind of encounter. A recent report in Seattle revealed that African-
Americans were eight times more likely than whites to be arrested and charged solely 
with the crime of obstruction, known by local law enforcement officers as “contempt of 
cop.” Eric Nalder, Lewis Kamb & Daniel Lathrop, ‘Obstructing’ Justice: Blacks Are 
Arrested on ‘Contempt of Cop’ Charge at Higher Rate, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, 
Feb. 28, 2008, at A1. In New York City, 87% of the 40,300 people arrested for the 
lowest-level misdemeanor marijuana possession in 2008 were black or Latino even 
though research suggests that whites are the heaviest users. Jim Dwyer, Whites Smoke 
Pot, But Blacks Are Arrested, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2009, at A24. 
 81 Some jurisdictions have enacted statutes that allow them to retain 
jurisdiction for a “reasonable” period of time following the expiration of the probation 
period within which hearings can be conducted for violations that occurred while the 
defendant was on probation. COHEN, supra note 2, § 18:19. Even in these jurisdictions, 
the probation violation hearing is generally avoided if formal revocation proceedings 
have not commenced prior to the expiration of the probation period. See United States 
v. Barton, 26 F.3d 490, 492 (4th Cir. 1994). In the federal system, for example, unless a 
warrant or summons has been issued prior to the expiration of probation, the court 
may not revoke a sentence for probation. 18 U.S.C. § 3565(c) (2006). 
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of his constitutional rights, including the presumption of 
innocence and the right to reasonable bail that will generally 
mean his release from custody. Is the enormous distinction in 
the treatment of these two defendants justified by any rational 
public policy? Is it fair? Does it lead to justice? 
If the alleged probation violator has the wherewithal 
and the fortitude to seek a probation violation hearing, that 
hearing will be one in which virtually all procedural protections 
for the accused have been removed.82 The accused enjoys no 
right to a trial by jury.83 The rules of evidence are relaxed such 
that hearsay may be introduced84 and illegally obtained 
evidence may be used.85 The right to confront and cross-
examine one’s accusers is a “conditional right” that a judge can 
take away.86 The burden of proof upon the prosecution, even if 
the allegation is that the probationer committed a new crime, 
is significantly reduced.87 In some jurisdictions, for example, the 
government must simply offer evidence such that a judge is 
“reasonably satisfied” that the probationer has violated a term 
or condition of probation.88 A probationer’s ability to obtain 
discovery in advance of the probation violation hearing is 
limited,89 and because the hearing often takes place before a 
trial of the new criminal charge is scheduled, probation 
violation hearings “are frequently held without the benefit of 
preparation that precedes a criminal trial.”90 
  
 82 See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787-90 (1973); Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483-89 (1972); see also State v. Gautier, 871 A.2d 347, 359 (R.I. 
2005) (noting that probation violation defendants “are afforded considerably less due 
process protection than that to which they are constitutionally entitled in a full-blown 
criminal trial”). 
 83 COHEN, supra note 2, § 21:49. In fact, revocation hearings may even be 
presided over by an “independent officer,” who is often a probation officer not directly 
involved in the case. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 486; see also Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 781, 786. 
 84 COHEN, supra note 2, § 20:11. 
 85 Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 369 (1998). 
 86 See Gautier, 871 A.2d at 359; Commonwealth v. Durling, 551 N.E.2d 1193, 
1199 (Mass. 1990); see also United States v. Waters, 1998 FED App. 0299P (6th Cir.).  
 87 KLEIN, supra note 74, at 260-61. 
 88 Id. at 260 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 89 COHEN, supra note 2, §§ 21:29-30. Courts have held that, unlike in a 
criminal proceeding where a defendant is entitled to disclosure of evidence if it is 
material to his or her case, in a probation violation hearing due process may not be 
denied if the government fails to disclose evidence, even potentially exculpatory 
evidence, so long as the government does not plan to use that evidence during a 
violation proceeding. See United States v. Neal, 512 F.3d 427, 436 (7th Cir. 2008); 
United States v. Derewal, 66 F.3d 52, 55 (3d Cir. 1995).  
 90 Commonwealth v. Cosgrove, 629 A.2d 1007, 1011 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). 
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In practice, unless the prosecution fails to present any 
evidence at all, the outcome of a probation violation hearing is 
often all but a foregone conclusion. When a probationer is 
found after a hearing to have violated the terms of his or her 
probation by committing a new crime, that probationer is often 
sentenced in a fashion that, in reality, is intended to punish the 
probationer for having committed the new crime. While the 
sentence is legally justified not as a sentence for the new 
offense, but rather as a sentence for violating the terms of 
probation,91 any honest assessment of the situation 
acknowledges the truth as perceived by all of the relevant 
players: the sentence is punishment for the new offense. Often 
the severity of the probation violation sentence is sufficient to 
allow the government either to offer a disposition on the new 
charge with a sentence that functionally merges with the 
probation violation sentence, or to forgo the prosecution of the 
new charge altogether. The outcome is that the prosecution 
gets the sentence it was seeking on the new charge without the 
burden of ever having to prove it. There is no need, under this 
system, to have a criminal trial, and our entire system of 
procedural protections for the accused is left on the sidelines. 
Something must be done to correct this abuse and restore the 
legitimacy of our criminal justice system. 
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO USING PROBATION AS A DEFAULT 
SENTENCE 
National reports indicate that as many as 80% of adult 
misdemeanor convictions result in sentences of probation.92 The 
sheer volume of misdemeanor probationers completely 
overwhelms the system, preventing probation from achieving 
any measure of effectiveness. It does not have to be this way. 
Virtually all jurisdictions employ alternative sentencing 
mechanisms besides probation to resolve criminal cases. If 
  
 91 See Lucido v. Superior Court, 795 P.2d 1223, 1230 (Cal. 1990) (“The 
fundamental role and responsibility of the hearing judge in a revocation proceeding is 
not to determine whether the probationer is guilty or innocent of a crime, but whether 
a violation of the terms of probation has occurred . . . .”); Gautier, 871 A.2d at 361 (“[A] 
probation-revocation hearing is considered a continuation of the original prosecution 
for which probation was imposed—in which the sole purpose is to determine whether a 
criminal defendant has breached a condition of his existing probation, not to convict 
that individual of a new criminal offense.”); Cosgrove, 629 A.2d at 1011 (“It is neither [a 
probation hearing’s] purpose nor function to serve as a final arbiter of an individual’s 
guilt or innocence of criminal charges.”). 
 92 Petersilia, Probation, supra note 6, at 173. 
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probation is no longer viewed as serving a rehabilitative 
function, then presumably probation is being used for its 
retributive or deterrent value. Non-probationary sentences, 
such as the imposition of time served, of a fine, of community 
service, or even of a finding of guilt without further 
punishment, can certainly carry as much retributive value as a 
probationary period that involves little supervision or, more 
commonly, no supervision at all. If the retributive value comes 
from conditions that might be attached to probation, those 
conditions can be enforced without reliance on probation. 
Similarly, the deterrent value of a probationary sentence, if 
there is any in fact, can frequently be equaled by the imposition 
of a non-probationary sentence. 
A. Debunking the Current Rationales for Probation 
As the system presently exists, the stated rationales 
supporting the extensive reliance on probation as a sentencing 
mechanism do not withstand scrutiny. The primary rationale—
that probation is cheaper than incarceration and that we 
simply do not have room in our jails and prisons for all of these 
defendants—relies on the premise that most or all of those who 
are placed on probation should be incarcerated. When as many 
as 80% of all misdemeanor convictions result in a period of 
probation, it is clear that these defendants are not being placed 
on probation as an alternative to incarceration.93 What the 
casual use of probation actually accomplishes for these 
defendants is the prospect of incarceration for a probation 
violation that would not otherwise exist if the person had not 
been placed on probation in the first place. This use of 
probation does not drive incarceration costs down, but rather 
quite the opposite. 
Another rationale for the reliance on probation as a 
sentencing mechanism is that probation is a form of retributive 
sentence. This might make sense in a context in which 
compliance with probation was onerous. If the vast majority of 
probationers report rarely or never, and if the level of 
supervision is diluted to the point of virtual non-existence, it is 
very hard to comprehend how probation exacts a form of 
retribution. The honest reality is that for most probationers, 
probation serves as little more than a noose around their neck, 
  
 93 Id. 
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waiting to be tightened when or if they have an encounter with 
the law. Any system that relies on a future encounter with the 
law as a triggering mechanism will have a grossly 
disproportionate impact on the urban poor and people of color.94 
As noted above, the retributive value of any conditions that 
might be attached to probation can be achieved by imposing 
those same conditions without imposing probation.95 
Yet another rationale for the reliance on probation as a 
sentencing mechanism is the notion that the mere fact that the 
offender is on probation will serve as a deterrent to future 
criminal conduct. But there are several flaws with this 
reasoning. There is very little empirical data supporting the 
general notion of deterrence theory with respect to probation.96 
Experts agree that a low probability threat of a severe sanction 
is not effective.97 For the vast majority of probationers who are 
obtaining little to no supervision, a violation of probation will 
occur only if there is an arrest for a new offense. Apprehension 
for criminal behavior is often a relatively low probability 
event.98 To the extent that a crime involves any premeditation 
rather than a response to impulse, the offender’s estimation of 
the probability of apprehension will certainly be low in an 
offender’s mind. Presumably the potential sentence for that 
new crime already serves as a deterrent, so the relevant 
deterrent value is the differential in deterrence that can be 
derived solely from one’s status as a probationer. With a 
complete absence of data on this question, it seems relatively 
  
 94 See supra note 80. 
 95 See supra Part IV. 
 96 See Petersilia, Probation, supra note 6, at 154-55; Faye S. Taxman, 
Supervision—Exploring the Dimensions of Effectiveness, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 2002, 
at 14. 
 97 See COHEN, supra note 2, § 1:7 (citing research suggesting that “certainty 
of punishment is a greater deterrent than severity of punishment”); Michael Tonry, 
The Functions of Sentencing and Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 37, 52 (2005) 
(“Current knowledge concerning deterrence is little different than eighteenth-century 
theorists supposed it to be: certainty and promptness of punishment are much more 
powerful deterrents than severity.”); Angela Hawken & Mark Kleiman, H.O.P.E. for 
Reform: What a Novel Probation Program in Hawaii Might Teach Other States, AM. 
PROSPECT, Apr. 10, 2007, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=hope_for_reform 
(noting that crime “attracts reckless and impulsive people, for whom deferred and low-
probability threats of severe punishment are less effective than immediate and high-
probability threats of mild punishment”). 
 98 See Tonry, supra note 97, at 53; see also Richard S. Frase, Punishment 
Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 79 (2005) (“[T]he detection rates for most crimes are 
very low, and the probability of an offender receiving a custody sentence is often less 
than one out of every one hundred crimes committed.”). 
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safe to assume that this differential is minimal if not non-
existent. 
The remaining rationale for the heavy reliance on 
probation as a sentencing mechanism, if one is honest about 
how it works, is that is makes the processing of a future 
criminal charge faster and easier for the prosecution. But this 
rationale, despite its efficiency, is the one that is so deeply 
troubling. It makes for very poor public policy choices in a 
variety of ways—not just who we incarcerate and for how long, 
but also how quickly we allow offenders to accumulate criminal 
records that render them unemployable and ineligible for most 
rental housing. And this process serves to seriously undermine 
the public perception of the fairness of the system.99 
If the legitimate justifications for such extraordinarily 
heavy reliance on probation do not hold up, the obvious 
solution is to stop using probation as the default non-jail 
sentence and start relying more heavily on other non-jail 
dispositions, particularly for misdemeanor offenses. This 
simple step can help restore the viability and credibility of the 
probationary sanction by precipitously reducing caseloads. 
With smaller caseloads, real support and supervision is an 
attainable goal and there is substantial research suggesting 
that it can make a real difference.100 Probation should be 
imposed sparingly and deliberately in the way in which it was 
historically intended: as a means of providing support and 
supervision to those select offenders for whom such support 
and supervision seems likely to make a difference. There is 
little value in using probation as a means of monitoring an 
offender’s performance of an identifiable condition of probation; 
that function can be served either directly by the court or by 
referral to an outside agency.101 Those offenders who are placed 
  
 99 A prime example of the public perception of the probation violation system 
can be found in an article published in the Providence Phoenix in 1997, the title of 
which tells the reader all he or she needs to know. Jody Ericson, Take a Ride on Rhode 
Island’s Revocation Railroad: Make One False Move While on Probation and Go 
Directly to Jail, PROVIDENCE PHOENIX, Oct. 3, 1997, at 9. A similar message can be 
found a decade later in the magazine Rhode Island Monthly. Guilty, Even While 
Innocent, R.I. MONTHLY, Dec. 2008. 
 100 See infra notes 138-144 and accompanying text. 
 101 In Rhode Island, a private not-for-profit entity called Justice Assistance 
has a contract with the courts to monitor compliance with conditions such as 
community service, domestic violence counseling, substance abuse counseling, mental 
health counseling, and restitution in cases in which probation is not ordered. See 
Justice Assistance, www.justiceassistance.org (last visited March 6, 2010). The agency 
reports back to the court to indicate compliance or non-compliance. Id. 
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on probation must receive much more than just monitoring, but 
also intervention, support, and supervision. 
B. Alternatives to Probation 
A wide variety of non-probationary sentences is 
available. One common non-probationary sentence is the 
“unconditional discharge” found in many state statutes. In New 
York, for example, a court may impose a sentence of 
unconditional discharge “if the court is of the opinion that no 
proper purpose would be served by imposing any condition 
upon the defendant’s release.”102 The statutory provision 
governing an unconditional discharge in Connecticut uses 
precisely the same language.103 In New Hampshire, an 
unconditional discharge may be imposed if the court is of the 
opinion that neither supervision nor any other condition would 
serve a proper purpose.104 The statutes in each of these states 
provide that a sentence of unconditional discharge “is for all 
purposes a final judgment of conviction.”105 
Pennsylvania uses different language to accomplish 
essentially the same function, explicitly allowing a court to 
impose a sentence of “guilt without further penalty.”106 In other 
jurisdictions, a plea of guilty followed by a sentence of “time 
served” has the same effect, creating a criminal conviction and 
discharging the offender with no further obligations to the 
court.107 
The statutory sentencing schemes in some states seem 
designed to discourage or prevent the overuse of probation by 
statute. In New Hampshire, for example, probation is not a 
permissible sentence for a Class B misdemeanor and may be 
imposed only if the offense is a felony or a Class A 
misdemeanor.108 Pennsylvania’s Sentencing Guidelines suggest 
  
 102 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.20 (McKinney 2009). 
 103 See CONN. GEN. STAT. §53a-34 (2007). 
 104 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:2 (VIII) (2007). 
 105 CONN. GEN. STAT. §53a-34 (b); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:2 (VIII); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 65.20. 
 106 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9753 (2007). 
 107 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-7-206 (2009) (providing that the court’s 
acceptance of a guilty plea “acts as a conviction for the offense); MINN. STAT. § 609.02, 
subd. 5 (2007) (defining a “conviction” as a plea of guilty or a verdict of guilty that is 
“accepted and recorded by the court”); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 1.20(13) (McKinney 2009) 
(defining a “conviction” as “the entry of a plea of guilty to, or a verdict of guilty upon, 
an accusatory instrument”).  
 108 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:2 (I), (III). 
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“the use of the least restrictive, non-confinement sentencing 
alternatives” appropriate to the case, including the 
“determination of guilt without further penalty.”109 Maine has 
gone much further, prohibiting the use of probation as a 
sentence in the majority of misdemeanor cases and making a 
sentence of unconditional discharge the default sentence even 
in those situations where probation is permissible.110 The Maine 
statute provides that a court may impose probation as a 
sentence only if it affirmatively finds that “the person is in 
need of the supervision, guidance, assistance or direction that 
probation can provide.”111 In the alternative, an offender “for 
whom the court determines that no other authorized 
sentencing alternative is appropriate punishment must be 
sentenced by the court to an unconditional discharge.”112 The 
adoption of these sentencing policies in Maine made an 
enormous difference in a very short period of time, with the 
number of probationers under supervision declining by over 
one-third between 2004 and 2007.113 During the same time 
frame the percentage of prison inmates incarcerated in Maine 
on a probation violation declined from 30% of the prison 
population to 25%.114 By 2005, Maine was among the top ten 
states in the country with the smallest percentage of its adult 
population under probation supervision.115 In New York, 
substantial use of the sentence of “time served” has helped 
keep probation numbers quite low.116 Statewide in 2007, more 
than 12% of misdemeanor convictions in New York were 
  
 109 10A PA. PRACTICE SERIES § 27:14, Driving Under the Influence (2009). 
 110 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1201 (2009). 
 111 Id. § 1201(2). 
 112 Id. § 1346 (emphasis added). The commentary to § 1201 notes that 
“probation should be used if it appears that the convicted person would be helped 
thereby” but that, “[a]bsent such a need, an unconditional discharge is warranted.” Id. 
§ 1201 cmt. 
 113 MARK RUBIN, TARGETED INTERVENTIONS COULD EASE MAINE’S PRISON AND 
JAIL POPULATIONS (2008), available at http://muskie.usm.maine.edu/justiceresearch/Pu 
blications/Adult/Targeted_Interventions_Could_Ease_ME_Prison_Jail_Population.pdf.  
 114 Id. 
 115 ANNUAL PROBATION SURVEY, 2005, supra note 44, at 3 tbl.1. 
 116 Like Maine, in 2005 New York was among the top ten states in the country 
with the smallest percentage of its adult population under probation supervision. Id. 
As will be developed elsewhere, this status can also be attributed to the widespread use 
of conditional discharge sentences and the imposition of fines. See infra notes 123-128 
and accompanying text. 
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resolved with a sentence of time served,117 while in New York 
City the percentage exceeded 17%.118 
The retributive and deterrent value of an unconditional 
discharge, a sentence of guilt without further penalty, or a 
sentence of time served is clear. In all of the statutory schemes 
cited above, the imposition of a sentence creates a criminal 
conviction. The mere fact of the criminal conviction carries all 
of the same retributive characteristics of a period of probation 
that entails no supervision. The criminal conviction is a matter 
of public record and available for all of the world to see. The 
stigma connected with being a convicted criminal is equally 
poignant without the accompanying period of probation, as are 
the adverse consequences for future employment and housing. 
And the fact of the conviction remains accessible and available 
for use against the defendant in any future court proceeding or 
sentence. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania acknowledged 
this general logic some time ago:  
In some instances, the court may decide that the needs of justice are 
fulfilled by a determination of guilt alone, without necessity for 
further penalty. The shame and trauma of public conviction may be 
punishment enough and there may be no need of any plan for 
‘reformation’ or control. In such cases, the courts should be free to 
make such a judgment without requiring useless probation.119 
Whatever deterrent value may be served by an offender’s 
awareness that the commission and detection of a new crime 
while on probation may carry an enhanced penalty—and there 
is no available evidence to suggest that such deterrent value 
even exists—can be replicated by a more intelligent graduated 
sentencing scheme for repeat offenders.  
The unconditional discharge is, of course, far from the 
only way to achieve the desired result of reducing excess 
reliance on probation while at the same time imposing a 
sentence that has retributive and deterrent value. Most states 
list a variety of alternative non-jail sentences in their array of 
sentencing possibilities, including community service, 
restitution, various counseling or educational regimens, and 
  
 117 N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, DISPOSITION OF ADULT 
ARRESTS, NEW YORK STATE 5 (2009), available at http://www.criminaljustice.state.ny. 
us/crimnet/ojsa/dispos/nys.pdf [hereinafter DISPOSITION OF ADULT ARRESTS, NEW YORK 
STATE]. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Commonwealth v. Rubright, 414 A.2d 106, 109 (Pa. 1980) (quoting S. TOLL, 
PENNSYLVANIA CRIMES CODE ANNOTATED § 1323 (Supp. 1978)). 
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fines. These conditions can and do have retributive value. 
Indeed, for many offenders a community service obligation is 
much more onerous than a period of probation, particularly if 
that probation is essentially unsupervised.120 Research studies 
have concluded that, as measured by recidivism rates, a 
community service sentence has no less deterrent value than a 
sentence of probation.121 Each of these sorts of conditions can be 
monitored either directly by the court through a future court 
appearance or through some outside agency without any need 
for probationary supervision. Indeed, the use of a probationary 
sentence to accomplish nothing more than monitoring of 
compliance with a specific condition is one of the primary 
reasons that probation has been so grossly overused. 
The easiest mechanism for overseeing the imposition of 
a specific alternative sanction is the use of the “conditional 
discharge.” In New York, for example,  
[A] court may impose a sentence of conditional discharge for an 
offense if the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of 
the offense and to the history, character and condition of the 
defendant, is of the opinion that neither the public interest nor the 
ends of justice would be served by a sentence of imprisonment and 
that probation supervision is not appropriate.122  
Other states have quite similar provisions. In New Hampshire, 
for example, a defendant “may be sentenced to a period of 
conditional discharge if such person is not imprisoned and the 
court is of the opinion that probationary supervision is 
unnecessary, but that the defendant’s conduct should be 
according to conditions determined by the court.”123 
Reliance on non-probationary alternative sentences has 
allowed some jurisdictions to keep their probation rates 
relatively under control. In 2007, almost one-third of all 
misdemeanor convictions in the state of New York resulted in a 
sentence of conditional discharge.124 When added to the 
misdemeanor cases resolved by sentences of time served and 
those resolved with the imposition of a fine, the total 
percentage of misdemeanor convictions resolved without resort 
  
 120 Michael Tonry, describing alternative sentencing in Europe, reports that 
“In law and in practice, CSOs (community service orders) are regarded in England as 
more intrusive and punitive than probation.” TONRY, supra note 24, at 122. 
 121 Id. at 122-23. 
 122 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.05 (1)(a) (2009). 
 123 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:2 (VI)(a) (2007). 
 124 See DISPOSITION OF ADULT ARRESTS, NEW YORK STATE, supra note 117, at 5. 
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to probation or incarceration was just under 75%.125 Fewer than 
5% of misdemeanor convictions resulted in probationary 
sentences.126 In New York City the numbers were even more 
pronounced, with over 40% of misdemeanor convictions being 
resolved with a conditional discharge and not even 1% 
sentenced to probation.127 Not surprisingly, then, in 2005 New 
York was listed among the top ten states in the country with 
the lowest percentage of its adult population under 
probationary supervision.128 And the vast majority of those 
adults on probation appear to be on probation for felony 
offenses, presumably a much wiser use of the limited 
supervisory resources available to the probation department. 
Similarly, as noted earlier, Maine has achieved substantial 
reductions in number of probationers by prohibiting the use of 
probation as a misdemeanor sentence except on a select 
category of misdemeanors.129 
Data in North Carolina indicate that of all cases 
resolved with a sentence defined as “community punishment” 
only one-third were sentenced to a period of supervised 
probation.130 Despite that fact, North Carolina’s percentage of 
adults on probation is nearly as high as the national average.131 
This anomalous result may be explained by what appears to be 
a quite unfortunate and ill-advised reliance on unsupervised 
probation, which is imposed in 44% of community punishment 
cases.132 That undue reliance may in turn be explained by the 
Criminal Code Commission’s rejection of a recommendation to 
include unconditional discharge as a sentencing option.133 If the 
high volume of unsupervised probation cases were excluded, 
the percentage of adults being supervised by probation officers 
would presumably be significantly reduced. 
  
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 See DISPOSITION OF ADULT ARRESTS, NEW YORK CITY, supra note 118, at 5. 
 128 ANNUAL PROBATION SURVEY, 2005, supra note 44, at 3 tbl.1. 
 129 See supra notes 110-115 and accompanying text. 
 130 N.C. SENTENCING AND POLICY ADVISORY COMM’N, STRUCTURED 
SENTENCING STATISTICAL REPORT FOR FELONIES AND MISDEMEANORS 50-51 (Feb. 
2008), available at http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/spac/Documents/ 
06-07statisticalreport.pdf. 
 131 ANNUAL PROBATION SURVEY, 2005, supra note 44, at 3 tbl.1. 
 132 N.C. SENTENCING AND POLICY ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 130, at 50-51. 
 133 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1301 cmt. (2009). 
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C. The Potential Benefits of Reform 
A substantial reduction in probation caseloads, 
particularly on the misdemeanor level, can have significant 
crime control ramifications with what would seem to be very 
little to no risk of adverse consequences. National statistics 
reveal that 75% of misdemeanor probationers complete their 
period of probation without violation.134 Since the majority of 
these probationers receive little to no support or supervision, 
one logical conclusion is that these offenders were not in need 
of any supervision.135 If that is the case, any potential benefits of 
the probationary sentence would seem to be far outstripped by 
the costs.136 The costs of placing enormous numbers of 
misdemeanor defendants on probation are very real. There are 
administrative and transactional costs connected to each 
probationer, even if he or she is totally unsupervised.137 For 
those probationers who do not succeed, there are costs 
connected to the entire violation process as well as to the 
potential escalation of a non-jail case into incarceration. With 
each failure the reputation of probation as a potentially 
effective crime control mechanism suffers. But perhaps most 
importantly, the opportunity cost—in both human and 
financial terms—connected with failing to provide actual 
support and supervision in a fashion that has some possibility 
of efficacy is immeasurable. 
Despite the popularity of the “nothing works” 
philosophy that first took hold in the 1970s, in fact there is a 
great deal of evidence that the provision of support services 
and supervision can work quite well in reducing recidivism and 
helping to control crime. The study that created the “nothing 
works” furor came under persistent and compelling attack from 
the moment of its publication. As a National Academy of 
Sciences Panel concluded in reevaluating the original “nothing 
works” study just three years after its publication, “when it is 
  
 134 See COHEN, supra note 2, § 1:23 n.3; Petersilia, Probation, supra note 6, at 
180-81. 
 135 Another logical conclusion may be that some of these probationers violated 
their probation but the violations went undetected. The higher the number of 
probationers in this category, the less value probation would seem to have as any sort 
of deterrent to future criminality. 
 136 See Petersilia, Probation, supra note 6, at 181 (questioning “the wisdom of 
placing such low-risk persons on probation in the first place” because the costs appear 
to outstrip the benefits). 
 137 Id. 
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asserted that ‘nothing works,’ the panel is uncertain as to just 
what has even been given a fair trial.”138 The programs that 
made up the basis of the “nothing works” study were “often not 
only underfunded and understaffed, but typically staffed by 
poorly trained and often unmotivated people.”139  
More recent research strongly supports the proposition 
that support services and supervision can have a meaningful 
impact on recidivism. In a leading study published in 1987, 
Professors Paul Gendreau and Robert Ross surveyed over 200 
studies on rehabilitative programs, concluding that “successful 
rehabilitation of offenders had been accomplished, and 
continued to be accomplished quite well.”140 They found that 
“reductions in recidivism, sometimes as substantial as 80 
percent, had been achieved in a considerable number of well-
controlled studies.”141 Research continuing on through the 
1990s, now known as the “what works” literature, consistently 
found similar results.142 In the case of drug addicted offenders, 
there is “rather solid empirical evidence that ordering offenders 
into treatment, and getting them to participate, reduces 
recidivism.”143 But these reductions in recidivism were seen only 
in “programs in which offenders both received surveillance 
(e.g., drug tests) and participated in relevant treatment.”144 
The plain reality is that probation can have a 
rehabilitative impact only if we return to the rational and 
judicious use of probation as a criminal sanction, allowing 
probation officers to engage constructively with probationers. 
That requires a manageable case load that can involve actual 
interaction and supervision, complete with referrals to viable 
treatment programs and adequate follow up to assure 
compliance. The lost opportunity to have a meaningful impact 
on an offender’s prospects for rehabilitation cannot be justified.  
  
 138 See Miller, supra note 1. 
 139 Id. (quoting criminologist Elliott Currie). 
 140 Paul Gendreau & Robert R. Ross, Revivification of Rehabilitation: Evidence 
from the 1980s, 4 JUST. Q. 349, 350-51 (1987). 
 141 Id. 
 142 See generally WHAT WORKS?: REDUCING REOFFENDING (James McGuire 
ed., 1995). 
 143 Petersilia, Crime Control, supra note 36, at 489. 
 144 Id. 
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V. THE RETURN TO A SYSTEM THAT APPROXIMATES JUSTICE 
If the American criminal justice system is to be true to 
its name and its purported mission, it must stop using the 
probation violation system as an end-run around due process to 
resolve new charges for those who are charged with committing 
a new offense while on probation. New criminal allegations 
should be prosecuted using the procedural mechanisms that 
have been developed throughout our history for the prosecution 
of criminal charges, whether or not the accused happens to be 
on probation at the time of the alleged offense or prosecution. 
While it may be appropriate to hold a probationer to a higher 
standard of behavior, it is not appropriate to let a probationer 
be prosecuted for a new criminal offense under a process that 
has been stripped of virtually all of its procedural protections. 
Creating protections against this sort of abuse of the probation 
violation system will reduce the temptation on the part of some 
sentencing judges to use probation as nothing more than a 
noose around an offender’s neck. Correcting this misguided use 
of probation will create both the appearance and, more 
importantly, the reality of observing constitutional principles 
and assuring fundamental fairness in this very broken part of 
the criminal justice system. 
It is plain to any observer, despite judicial protestations 
to the contrary, that judges frequently impose probation 
violation sentences based upon a new criminal allegation in a 
fashion that is designed to punish the probationer for the new 
criminal allegation. The consequences in terms of fairness, both 
in actuality and in the public perception, are devastating. In 
Rhode Island, media coverage of the issue has generated 
headlines including “Found Innocent, But Still Jailed,”145 
“Guilty, Even While Innocent,”146 and “Take a Ride on Rhode 
Island’s Revocation Railroad.”147 Each of these articles lays out 
in compelling terms multiple scenarios in which probation 
violation hearings were held in advance of, and used as 
substitutes for, criminal trials based upon new criminal 
allegations. Even when a probationer has been acquitted after 
a trial of the new criminal charge, a lengthy sentence based 
upon that same conduct continues unabated. Often, the 
  
 145 John Hill, Found Innocent, But Still Jailed, PROVIDENCE J., Aug. 9. 2009, 
at A1. 
 146 Guilty, Even While Innocent, supra note 99. 
 147 Ericson, supra note 99. 
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prosecution of a new criminal charge is abandoned or short-
circuited after a violation hearing because the probationer has 
already received the desired sentence on the probation 
violation and the adversarial testing of the new criminal 
allegation never takes place. 
Tellingly, there is but one context in which the courts 
have routinely recognized the inadequacy of using the 
probation violation hearing as a substitute for a criminal trial: 
when the accused wins. The courts seem to have little trouble 
upholding lengthy sentences following from probation violation 
hearings conducted with minimal procedural protections for 
the innocent. But when a hearing court has found that the 
government’s evidence is insufficient to meet even the reduced 
burden of proof used at a violation hearing, the majority of 
jurisdictions have rejected the application of collateral estoppel 
to prevent the government from nonetheless proceeding with a 
trial based on the same allegations.148 When faced with a not 
guilty finding at a violation hearing, those courts have 
maintained that the criminal trial process is “the intended 
forum for ultimate determinations as to guilt or innocence of 
newly alleged crimes”149 and that applying collateral estoppel to 
prevent the criminal prosecution of the new charge “would 
undesirably alter the criminal trial process by permitting 
informal revocation determinations to displace the intended 
factfinding function of the trial.”150 The Superior Court of 
Pennsylvania, in rejecting the application of collateral estoppel 
to a not guilty finding at a probation violation hearing, 
explained that: 
It is neither the[] purpose nor function [of a violation hearing] to 
serve as a final arbiter of an individual’s guilt or innocence of 
criminal charges. It is only through a criminal trial at which the 
defendant is presumed innocent and the [government] bears the 
burden of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that contested 
  
 148 See, e.g., Lucido v. Superior Court, 795 P.2d 1223, 1232-33 (Cal. 1990); 
State v. McDowell, 699 A.2d 987, 990 (Conn. 1997); Commonwealth v. Cosgrove, 629 
A.2d 1007, 1011 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); State v. Gautier, 871 A.2d 347, 360-61 (R.I. 
2005); State v. Brunet, 806 A.2d 1007, 1008 (Vt. 2002). See generally George L. Blum, 
Annotation, Determination that State Failed to Prove Charges Relied Upon for 
Revocation of Probation as Barring Subsequent Criminal Action Based on Same 
Underlying Charges, 2 A.L.R. 5th 262 (1992 & Supp.) (collecting and discussing cases 
deciding whether the government’s failure to prove a probation violation at a 
revocation hearing precludes a subsequent criminal prosecution based upon the same 
underlying conduct). 
 149 Lucido, 795 P.2d at 1230-31. 
 150 Id. at 1229. 
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issues of criminal culpability are determined with finality. To cede 
this responsibility to a setting that does not adhere to the procedural 
safeguards necessary for a fair adjudication of guilt, such as a 
probation revocation hearing, would result in a perversion of the 
criminal justice system.151 
More than one judge has described this process as a “Heads I 
win, tails I flip again” proposition,152 allowing the government to 
present minimal evidence at a violation hearing with an option 
to try again at a trial if unsuccessful. The accused, on the other 
hand, must litigate fully at the probation violation hearing 
because he or she faces dire consequences if found to be a 
violator. 
This scenario can easily be avoided by sequencing the 
events differently. If a new criminal charge is adjudicated in 
advance of the probation violation hearing, the substitution of 
the violation hearing for the trial will never take place. If the 
probationer admits to or is convicted of the new offense, the 
probation violation has been established without sacrificing the 
procedural screening mechanisms upon which we rely. And if 
the probationer is acquitted at a trial or the charge is 
dismissed, under present law the prosecution can generally 
still proceed with a probation violation allegation.153 The fact 
that prosecutors in so many jurisdictions resist all attempts to 
sequence events in this fashion, despite pleas from the 
American Bar Association154 and sometimes from their own 
courts155 to do so, reveals a great deal about the motivations 
  
 151 Cosgrove, 629 A.2d at 1011. 
 152 Lucido, 795 P.2d at 1243 (Broussard, J., dissenting) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); McDowell, 699 A.2d at 992 (Berdon, J., dissenting) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Lucido, 795 P.2d at 1243 (Broussard, J., dissenting)); Brunet, 
806 A.2d at 1017 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Lucido, 795 P.2d at 1243 (Broussard, J., dissenting)). 
 153 See COHEN, supra note 2, § 22:15. Simple fairness, in addition to respect 
for the values underlying the criminal justice system, would suggest that this practice 
be abandoned. 
 154 AMERICAN BAR ASSOC., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 
SENTENCING § 18-7.4 (h) (3d ed. 1994) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, SENTENCING] (“When an alleged violation is based solely on the alleged 
commission of another offense, the rules should provide that the final hearing on the 
alleged violation ordinarily should be held after disposition of the new criminal 
charge.”); see also AMERICAN BAR ASSOC., STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION § 5.3 
(1970) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION] (“A revocation 
proceeding based solely upon commission of another crime ordinarily should not be 
initiated prior to the disposition of that charge.”). 
 155 See, e.g., People v. Coleman, 533 P.2d 1024, 1046 (Cal. 1975) (“[W]e wish to 
note that the most desirable method of handling the problems of concurrent criminal 
and probation revocation proceedings may well be for revocation proceedings not even 
to be initiated until after disposition of the related criminal proceedings.”); State v. 
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behind their use of probation and the probation violation 
system.  
Several procedural requirements could be implemented 
that would make the probation violation process much fairer. 
Sequencing events so that a trial on a new criminal allegation 
precedes a probation violation hearing based upon that same 
conduct, the most obvious of these reforms, has been promoted 
by the American Bar Association for decades. Section 18-7.4 (h) 
of the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal 
Justice provides that “[w]hen an alleged violation is based 
solely on the alleged commission of another offense, the rules 
should provide that the final hearing on the alleged violation 
ordinarily should be held after disposition of the new criminal 
charge.”156 Commentary to an earlier version of the standards, 
explaining this sequencing recommendation, explicitly 
recognized the danger at issue, noting that the relaxation of the 
rules of evidence, the absence of a jury, and the lowering of the 
burden of proof “can lead to an abuse of the proceeding by 
basing revocation upon a new criminal offense when the offense 
could not be proved in an ordinary criminal trial.”157 The 
commentary further noted that “it would be unseemly for the 
probation court to conclude, counter to the result of a criminal 
trial, that an offense has occurred and that it could provide a 
basis for a revocation.”158 
The First Circuit has likewise acknowledged the serious 
potential for abuse in holding a violation hearing based upon a 
new criminal allegation before the disposition or trial of the 
new charge. In Flint v. Mullen,159 a case in which a probationer 
was sentenced to twelve years on a violation based solely on a 
criminal charge upon which he was ultimately acquitted, the 
court indicated its view that “it would be preferable for the 
state to have held the violation hearing after the . . . trial,”160 
  
Chase, 588 A.2d 120, 123 (R.I. 1991) (“The disposition of the instant case should 
encourage the state to initiate future probation-revocation proceedings with more 
concern for judicial economy.”); State v. Begins, 514 A.2d 719, 723 (Vt. 1986) (“We 
caution against a policy of scheduling probation revocation hearings prior to trial, 
without exercising discretion in each case. . . . [T]he better method of dealing with 
problems of concurrent criminal and probation revocation jurisdiction is to postpone 
the probation proceedings until after disposition of related criminal proceedings . . . .”). 
 156 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SENTENCING, supra note 154, 
§ 18-7.4 (h). 
 157 ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION, supra note 154, § 5.3 cmt. 
 158 Id. 
 159 499 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1974). 
 160 Id. at 105. 
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adding that it could “see little public interest served by this 
kind of timing.”161 As the court explained: 
Were the order reversed, the alleged violator could be held on high 
bail or without bail if he were a poor bail risk. If there were a 
criminal conviction, the subsequent violation decision would be 
simple; if there were an acquittal, the court conducting the violation 
hearing could proceed with full knowledge of that result, remaining 
free to weigh evidence by a lower standard, but having in mind the 
acquittal. The result is apt to be, if not also appear, more just.162 
The Supreme Courts of Vermont and California have both 
opined that the “better” or “most desirable” method of handling 
concurrent criminal and probation violation proceedings is for 
the trial to proceed first.163 
One is hard pressed to find legitimate justifications for 
holding a violation hearing based upon a new criminal 
allegation in advance of a criminal trial. The only justification 
that appears in any of the case law concerns the issue of 
detention in advance of the hearing, particularly in light of the 
constitutional requirement that a violation hearing take place 
“within a reasonable time after the [probationer] is taken into 
custody.”164 Several responses to this potential objection make 
its resolution rather easy. In many settings, the primary 
justification for detention lies not in the person’s status as a 
probationer, but rather in his or her status as a person with a 
criminal history accused of a new crime. That detention can be 
accomplished by the setting of appropriate bail (or holding the 
accused without bail when permitted) on the new criminal 
offense. In such a scenario, there would be no need for the 
prosecution to file the probation violation allegation until after 
the new criminal charge is resolved. Another response could be 
to detain the probationer on the alleged violation and put the 
decision about sequencing in the hands of the probationer, 
allowing the probationer to waive the right to a prompt 
violation hearing in order to delay it until after the resolution 
of the new criminal charge. 
When one pushes past objections about detention while 
awaiting a violation hearing, it becomes apparent that a 
primary reason for sequencing the events as many states do is 
  
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
 163 State v. Begins, 514 A.2d 719, 723 (Vt. 1986); People v. Coleman, 533 P.2d 
1024, 1046 (Cal. 1975). 
 164 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972). 
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to accomplish just what must be prohibited: the creation of a 
system in which the right to a trial by jury, the right to fully 
confront witnesses, and the right to put the government to its 
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt recede into the 
background and prosecution by violation hearing becomes the 
norm. Perhaps the most obvious and extreme abuses come in 
the cases that buck the trend of this shadow system, those in 
which the probationer prevails at the probation violation 
hearing and is nonetheless prosecuted for the underlying new 
crime, and those in which the probationer, having been found 
in violation and sentenced severely, prevails at the criminal 
trial. In either scenario, the perception, if not the reality, is 
that an end-run has been made around the Constitution. Even 
if one were to tolerate a system in which a probation violation 
hearing comes first, these particular abuses could be stopped. 
If the government chooses to present a probationer as a 
violator and move forward with a violation hearing, it does not 
seem unreasonable to force the government to live with the 
consequences of its decision. If the government, even with the 
benefit of relaxed rules of evidence, cannot meet a reduced 
burden of proof at a violation hearing, it is unclear why the 
government should then be allowed another chance to try to 
prove the same allegations. But in the majority of jurisdictions 
in this country, the government enjoys just that privilege. 
Ironically, as noted earlier, courts ruling in this fashion have 
generally relied on the argument that the procedures employed 
at a violation hearing are insufficiently reliable to justify using 
them to resolve a criminal charge. These courts seem not to 
recognize the irony that this is precisely how probation 
violation hearings are used on a daily basis in thousands of 
cases. Common principles of collateral estoppel should be 
employed, as they are in some jurisdictions,165 to prevent the 
government from relitigating an issue that it lost. 
  
 165 See People v. Bone, 412 N.E.2d 444, 447 (Ill. 1980) (noting that collateral 
estoppel will apply when “an issue of ultimate fact was decided in the prior revocation 
proceeding which was determinative of the issues in the criminal prosecution for the 
offenses”); People v. Anzures, 670 P.2d 1258, 1260 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that 
collateral estoppel will apply although the revocation hearing and criminal charge are 
“technically based on the commission of wholly separate offenses, but where the same 
facts are determinative of guilt for each”); State v. Bradley, 626 P.2d 403, 406 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1988) (noting that an “express finding on a matter of fact material to a probation 
revocation proceeding will collaterally estop the state from” relitigating the same issue 
where the issue was “fully litigated at the probation revocation proceeding” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
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When a probationer is found to have been in violation of 
probation based upon a new criminal charge and is ultimately 
acquitted of that new charge, again the probationer seems to be 
a victim of a gaming of the system. This scenario would be 
avoided by sequencing the events properly, but if the hearing 
must proceed first, it does not seem unreasonable to let the 
issue be revisited in the light of an acquittal after a full trial 
replete with constitutional protections. Another way of 
reducing the likelihood of this scenario, and of enhancing the 
reliability and fairness of a probation violation hearing, would 
be to elevate the government’s burden of proof at a probation 
violation hearing. The greater the disparity between the 
government’s burden at a violation hearing and the 
government’s burden at a trial, the greater the likelihood of 
unjust or disparate outcomes. When the government’s burden 
at a violation hearing is as low as the “reasonable satisfaction” 
of the judge, it is far from surprising when a charge that cannot 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt results in a finding of 
violation. Do we really intend to have a system in which 
probationers can be convicted of new crimes based on a lesser 
standard of proof achieved through the introduction of evidence 
that would normally be inadmissible? The distance between the 
language found in court decisions explaining the purported 
purpose of probation violation hearings and the reality as 
experienced by participants in the criminal justice system is 
staggering. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Something has gone terribly wrong in the American 
criminal justice system. In the process of moving from a system 
focused on the rehabilitative potential of the defendant to a 
system myopically focused on retribution, we have trampled 
not only upon the tool with the greatest rehabilitative 
potential, but also upon the due process protections that we 
supposedly hold most dear. By using probation as a default 
sentence for all of those whom we choose not to incarcerate, we 
have created burgeoning caseloads that prevent probation from 
serving any useful rehabilitative function. Many probationers 
go without any supervision whatsoever, and those who are in 
need of social services and support rarely get it. Not 
surprisingly, then, high percentages of probationers do not 
succeed on probation. Many of those wind up incarcerated, 
even though the system’s conclusion was that the underlying 
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crime did not justify incarceration. The “crime” that we punish 
with incarceration is the inability to live up to the terms and 
conditions of probation, even if it was entirely unrealistic to 
expect the probationer to live up to those terms and conditions 
and entirely predictable that the probationer would fail. This is 
a peculiar way indeed to make determinations about whom to 
incarcerate. A far more logical system would use probation only 
when it can serve a real function. In that fashion, probation 
officers could actually do their jobs, future criminality could be 
dealt with on its own terms, and a simple failure to abide by 
imposed norms of behavior and conformity would not become a 
cause for incarceration. 
One reason it may be hard to convince some 
constituencies to abandon the abuse of probation is that they 
are wedded to what follows from that abuse: a shadow criminal 
justice system in which huge numbers of cases are processed 
not through the due process protections that come with the 
prosecution of a criminal charge, but through a violation 
hearing process that is devoid of virtually all of these 
protections. This process is certainly efficient, but does not 
reflect the values of justice that our system is supposed to 
represent. It is simply inappropriate to hold a violation hearing 
at which a criminal charge is adjudicated not through a 
criminal trial replete with protections for the innocent, but 
rather through a truncated procedure designed for a very 
different purpose.  
If we persist in proceeding with a probation violation 
hearing in advance of a criminal trial on a new charge, we can 
at least aspire to level the playing field just a little bit. Those 
jurisdictions with very low burdens of proof can require at least 
proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence. And if the 
accused manages to prevail at a probation violation hearing 
based solely on a new criminal charge, traditional principles of 
collateral estoppel should prevent the government from trying 
a second time to prosecute the accused for the same behavior. 
We are all losers when we engage in a process for which 
the thinly veiled legal justification is readily transparent to all 
as a fraud. All criminal charges should be adjudicated on the 
merits. When a probation violation is predicated on a new 
criminal charge, the adjudication of that new charge should 
normally resolve the issue of whether or not the terms and 
conditions of probation have been violated. If the criminal 
charge cannot be successfully prosecuted, it should follow that 
the probation violation should be dismissed. And if we insist on 
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a process that adjudicates the probation violation first, we can 
at least abide by procedural rules that more closely 
approximate fairness. We owe it to ourselves to restore the 
public’s faith in the integrity of the prosecutorial function and 
to put the concept of justice back into the criminal justice 
system. 
